Unseaworthy Shore-Based Equipment by O\u27Brien, John R.
Hastings Law Journal




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
John R. O'Brien, Unseaworthy Shore-Based Equipment, 18 Hastings L.J. 1021 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss4/12
cases106 are a contemporary example of non-contractual indemnity in admiralty
and lend support to the granting of relief in the shipowner-third party situation.
The strongest support for the shipowner can be found in the FELA indemnity
cases.' 07 The applicability of cases arising under the FELA in the area of personal
injury to the field of maritime employment is unquestionable. The employer-third
party indemnity problem which is an unavoidable consequence of this field of
personal injuries should be within this scope of application.
Precedent and the equities'0 8 involved would seem to be clearly in favor of
the shipowner. The third party should not be allowed to place the burden of hs
negligence on the shipowner merely because the seaman fails to prosecute Ins
claim against him or because the order in wich the seaman prosecutes Ins various
claims leaves the shipowner without a right of recovery against the third party.
Michael Cavalier Durney*
106 Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Gooden
v. Texaco, Inc., 255 F Supp. 343, 1966 A.M.C. 1704 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
107 Cases cited notes 72-4, 84 supra.
10 8 GroRP & BLAcK 276.
* Member, Second Year Class.
UNSEAWORTHY SHORE-BASED EQUIPMENT
It is a well-established rule of maritime law that every slupowner warrants
the seaworthiness of his vessel.' This means that the shipowner is under an abso-
lute duty "to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use."2 For failure to perform this duty the shipowner is strictly liable; for liability
for unseaworthnness is a species of liability without fault.3 Although the Supreme
Court has greatly altered the concept of seaworthiness since its first application
to maritime personal injuries,4 the Court still has not extended the protection of
1 The classic statement of the liability for unseaworthmess appears in The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Court said: "the vessel and her owner are liable to an
indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthnness of
the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant
to the slhp." Id. at 175.
2 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550, 1960 A.M.C. 1503, 1512
(1960).
"A vessel's unseaworthmness might arise from any number of individualized circum-
stances. Her gear might be defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew unfit.
The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage, night be nnproper
Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165, 170, 1962 A.M.C. 1450, 1454 (1962).
3 E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 704 (1946);
Mahmich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
4 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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the warranty to injuries caused by shore-based equipment. In the typical situation,
a longshoreman or other shore-worker, while engaged in the loading or unloading
of a vessel docked upon navigable waters, is injured or killed by defective shore-
based equipment used in the loading or discharge operations.5 Traditionally such
eqipment has not been within the scope of the warranty since it is neither a part
of the vessel itself, nor owned by the shipowner. Rather, it is usually owned and
operated by the stevedore company or another independent contractor. There is
a sharp conflict of authority m the lower federal courts as to whether such equip-
ment should be within the scope of the warranty,6 and the question appears to be
ripe for decision by the United States Supreme Court.
Treatment by the Supreme Court-The Liberal Trend
The decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated a liberal trend m favor of
increased protection against the unseaworthmess of a slnp.7 The traditional pro-
tection given by the warranty of seaworthiness included only "seamen," i.e., those
5 E.g., Shore-based marine leg (conveyor system used in gram loading and unload-
ing operations), Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 1966 A.M.C. 1415
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966); shore-based hopper, Spann v. Lauritzen,
344 F.2d 204, 1965 A.M.C. 1192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965); shore-
based crane, Huff v. Matson Nay. Co., 338 F.2d 205, 1964 A.M.C. 2219 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); gram trimmer (spout used to position gram during
loading), Sherbin v. S. G. Embmcos, 200 F Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962); baggage chute,
Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
6 Cases extending the warranty of seaworthiness to shore-based equipment: Deffes
v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 1966 A.M.C. 1415 (5th Cir. 1966); Spann
v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204, 1965 A.M.C. 1192 (3d Cir. 1965); Huff v. Matson Nay.
Co., 338 F.2d 205, 1964 A.M.C. 2219 (9th Cir. 1964); Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torm, 245
F Supp. 227, 1965 A.M.C. 2271 (D. Md. 1965); Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F
Supp 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1966) (dictum); Daniel v. Skibs A.S. Hilda Knudson, 253 F Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 368 F.2d 179 (1966) (by implication); Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F Supp. 983
(E.D. Va. 1966) (by implication); see Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Leary,
1966 A.M.C. 1237 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra. S.A., 362 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1966); Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Co., 163 F Supp. 107 (D. Mass.
1958).
Cases refusing to extend the warranty of seaworthiness to shore-based equipment:
Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638, 1964 A.M.C. 356 (2d Cir. 1963);
McKmght v. N. M. Patterson & Sons, 181 F Supp. 434, 1960 A.M.C. 1760 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961); Henry v. S.S.
Mount Evans, 227 F Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1964); Miller v. Transandina Cia Nav. S.A.,
1964 A.M.C. 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Sherbin v. S. G. Embmcos, 200 F Supp. 874,
1962 A.M.C. 1013 (E.D. La. 1962); K. A. Cockrell v. A. L. Meehling Barge Lines, Inc.,
192 F Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d
450 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); see Kent v. Shell Oil
Co., 286 F.2d 746, 1961 A.M.C. 1671 (5th Cir. 1961).
7 See, e.g., Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Long-
shoremen, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1137 (1963); Note, Extension of the Unseaworthiness
Remedy to Longshoremen-Triumph of Doctrine Over Statute, 15 W REs. L. REv. 753
(1964).
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men who actually go to sea.8 In Seas Shzpping Co. v. Sierackt,9 the Court took the
first significant step toward increasing the number of persons protected under the
doctrine by holding that all longshoremen working m the ship's service on board
the ship can recover for the ship's unseaworthiness. The plaintiff was a longshore-
man who was injured while working on board the ship during the loading opera-
tions. The Court, m allowing recovery, said that "historically the work of loading
and unloading is the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times by
members of the crew 10 For these purposes [the longshoreman] is, in short,
a seaman because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards."'1
In Pope & Talbot v. Hawn12 the Supreme Court interpreted Sieracki broadly
and extended the protection given by the warranty to all shore-workers engaged
m the ship's service on board the ship. A carpenter was repairing the ship's gram
loading equipment when he slipped on some loose gram and fell through an open
batch of the ship. In allowing recovery for unseaworthiness, the Court refused to
distinguish Sierackt: "Sieracki's legal protection was not based on the name
'stevedore' but on the type of work he did and its relationship to the ship and to
the historic doctrine of seaworthiness."S The carpenter's need for protection from
unseaworthiness was no less than that of the longshoremen working with him or
the seamen who were about to go to sea. "All were subjected to the same danger.
All were entitled to like treatment under law."1 4 Thus, the Court confirmed the
emphasis that Sierackz had put upon the plaintiff's performance in the ship's service
as the test for recovery for unseaworthmess. By analogy tis has been applied to a
large variety of shore-workers' 5 who were injured while performing the ship's
service.
In Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson,16 the equipment which the shipowner warrants
to be seaworthy was held to include not only the ship's equipment, which was
traditionally included,' 7 but also equipment funushed by the stevedore for use on
the ship m the ship's service. The plaintiff was injured when a block, which was
8 Non-seamen were regarded as "business invitees" to whom the shipowner was
liable only for the failure to exercise reasonable care. E.g., Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d
127 (2d Cir. 1945); The Etna, 43 F Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1942); The S.S. Anderson,
37 F Supp. 695 (D. Md. 1941).
9 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
10 Id. at 96, 1946 A.M.C. at 705. Contra, Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Un-
seaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1140-47 (1963);
Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness & the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cownrms L.Q.
381, 413-14 (1954); Note, 34 CA.IF. L. REv. 601 (1946).
11328 U.S. at 99, 1946 A.M.C. at 708.
12 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953).
13 Id. at 412-13, 1954 A.M.C. at 9.
14 Id. at 413, 1954 A.M.C. at 9.
15 E.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 1959 A.M.C. 813 (1959) (repair-
man); Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143, 1955 A.M.C. 513 (2d Cir. 1955) (painter)
(by implication); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 1953 A.M.C. 1799
(3d Cir. 1953) (cleaner); see Annot., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1764 (1959).
16205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curtam, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C. 860
(1954).
17E.g., Mahich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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being used in the loading operations,' 8 broke and caused some loading gear to
fall upon his leg. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals19 which had held the ship unseaworthy due to the defective condition of
the block even though it had been furnished by the stevedore.20
Lastly, in Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,21 the location of both the injury
and the equpment causing it was held to be mimatenal, though both were on the
shore. A longshoreman who was on the dock helping with the unloading operations
slipped on some loose beans that had spilled out of defective bags unloaded from
the ship. Due to the defective condition of the cargo bags, and despite their
location on the dock, the ship was found unseaworthy and the longshoreman was
allowed to recover.
22
Prerequisites for Unseaworthy Shore-Based Equipment
The preceding cases establish the groundwork for a further extension by the
Supreme Court of the warranty of seaworthiness to shore-based equipment.23 In
order to find a ship unseaworthy and thereby hold the shipowner liable for an
injury or death caused by defective shore-based equipment, the lower courts
24
have looked for two prerequisites: (1) the plaintiff must be engaged in the
18 To resolve a conflict m the evidence, the Court assumed it was furmshed by the
stevedore.
39 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
20 This decision was promptly confirmed in Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S.
984, 1954 A.M.C. 1088 (1954), reversing per curtain 205 F.2d 57, 1953 A.M.C. 1679
(3d Cir. 1953). Plaintiff, a longshoreman, was aboard the ship engaged m an unloading
operation involving one of the ship's booms, two ship's winches, the sWp's runner on
one winch, and the stevedore's land-fall runner on the other. The Court of Appeals
held that "the statement that the vessel adopted the runner as an appurtenance is simply
not justified by the record." 205 F.2d at 57, 1953 A.M.C. at 1680. The Supreme Court's
reversal per curiam clearly confirms Petterson; but whether the Court meant to adopt
the principle that the land-fall runner was adopted by the ship as an appurtenance is
not clear.
21373 U.S. 206, 1963 A.M.C. 1649 (1963).
22 The Court held, "[T]he duty to provide a seaworthy ship and gear, including
cargo containers, 'applies to longshoremen unloading the ship whether they are standing
aboard ship or on the pier," 373 U.S. at 215, 1963 A.M.C. at 1656. (Emphasis added.)
This decision confirmed several lower federal court cases. E.g., Thompson v. Calmar
S.S. Co., 331 F.2d 657, 1964 A.M.C. 2249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964);
Pope & Talbot v. Cordray, 258 F.2d 214, 1959 A.M.C. 603 (9th Cir. 1958); Strika v.
Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 1951 A.M.C. 84 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
dented, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
23 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on this issue in Roper v. United
States, 368 U.S. 20, 1961 A.M.C. 2499 (1961), where the plaintiff was injured by a
land-based marine leg (gram-loading device). But the finding that the vessel was out
of navigation, and that the seaworthiness of the vessel and its equipment was not war-
ranted as a result, made it unnecessary to decide whether seaworthiness extended to the
shore-based equipment.
24 E.g., Daniel v. Skibs A.S. Hilda Knudson, 253 F Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1966); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204, 1965 A.M.C. 1192 (3d
Cir. 1965); Sherbm v. S. G. Embincos, 200 F Supp. 874, 1962 A.M.C. 1013 (E.D. La.
1962).
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service of the vessel; and (2) the eqipment must be part of the hull, gear, ap-
pliances or appurtenances of the ship. Though the courts have considered these
requirements separately, they seem to be based upon the same principles, since
many courts have generally found an appurtenance to be anything adopted by
the ship in performance of the ship's service.25 Thus if the plaintiff is performing
the ship's service and he is in]ured by equipment used in that service, the ship
can be found unseaworthy and the plaintiff allowed to recover. It is not necessary
to consider any other factor if these requirements are met.
Plaintiff in the Ship's Service
In order to be protected by the warranty of seaworthiness, the plaintiff must
perform work in the ship's service,26 i.e., work that is traditionally that of the
ship's crew. This was firmly established in the Sieracki27 and Hawn 2s cases. The
test is, however, not what label is given to the type of work being done, but the
nature of the task being performed and its relation to the ship.2 9 For example, in
Hawn the plaintiff was a carpenter who was injured while repairing the ship's
gram loading equipment. The Court did not consider the label given to ins work,
i.e., carpentry, important, but rather the nature and purposes of Hawn's duties
which were in the ship's service.
Some courts, however, when faced with clains of plaintiffs whose injuries were
caused by defective shore-based equipment, have looked beyond the nature of
the work being done by the plaintiff and imposed additional restrictions. For
example, in McKnight v. N.M. Patterson & Sons,30 a longshoreman was demed
recovery for unseaworthmess after being struck by part of the unloading gear
being lowered into the ship's hold by means of a stevedore-owned and operated
shore-based crane. The court held that although the plaintiff was doing traditional
seaman's work, since he was injured by stevedore-equipment not usually found on
the ship he was not incurring a seaman's hazards, but rather a stevedore's hazards,
which were what he was being paid to incur.
25E.g., Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984, 1954 A.M.C. 1088 (1954),
reversng per curiam 205 F.2d 57, 1953 A.M.C. 1679 (3d Cir. 1953); Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curtam, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C.
860 (1954); Rodriguez v. Coastal Ship Corp., 210 F Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Wybor-
ski v. Bristol City Line of Steamships, Ltd., 191 F Supp. 884, 892, 1966 A.M.C. 1885,
1895 (D. Md. 1961); Casbon v. Stockard S.S. Corp., 173 F Supp. 845, 1959 A.M.C.
1906 (E.D. La. 1959); Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F Supp. 107 (D.
Mass. 1958); see Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C.
1075 (1964); Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 1963 A.M.C. 1373 (1963).
2 6 E.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 1959 A.M.C. 580
(1959); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953); Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracla, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
2
7 "[T]he liability arises as an incident, not merely of the seaman's contract, but of
performing the ship's service with the owner's consent." 328 U.S. 85, 97, 1946 A.M.C.
698, 706 (1946).
28 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953).
29 E.g., Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953); Pope & Talbot
v. Cordray, 258 F.2d 214, 1959 A.M.C. 603 (9th Cir. 1958).
30 181 F Supp. 434, 1960 A.M.C. 1760 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir.
1960).
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This reasoning unfortunately fails to recognize the basic theory of Sierack: if
the plaintiff is engaged in the loading or unloading process, he is incurrmg the
hazards of the ship's service and should be within the scope of protection. 3 '
Stated simply, while loading and unloading a vessel, the seaman and the stevedore
risk the same hazards.
Problems may arise, however, in determining exactly what the loading and
unloading process includes, and hence whether the plaintiff is in the sinp's
service. For example, in Spann v. Lauritzen 2 a shore-based crane was being used
to unload a bulk cargo of nitrate from the ship into a shore-based hopper. Each
time the hopper was full,83 it was the plaintiff's duty to release the nitrate from
the hopper into the truck below it. He was injured by a sudden movement of the
release bar of the hopper when a load of nitrate was dropped into the hopper. The
court found that the plaintiff was engaged in the unloading process even though
the loading of trucks was being accomplished by use of the shore-based hopper
at the same time. The court said that the hopper was essential to the unloading
process, as was plaintiff's duty to unload it; for if it were not emptied, the unload-
ing process could not continue. Therefore, the plaintiff was found to be engaged
in the ship's service and permitted to recover for unseaworthiness.
The beginning of the loading process 4 and the completion of the unloading
process3 5 have long been held to be within the traditional work of seamen. Yet,
it is obvious that some limits must be placed upon the beginning of the loading
process and the termination of the unloading process for the purpose of recovery
for unseawortuness.3 6 For there are "an almost limitless variety of situations in
3 1 See, e.g., Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, 361 F.2d 422, 426, 1966 A.M.C. 1415,
1421 (5th Cir. 1966)-
If one is performing seaman's work, by definition he must be subjecting himself
to a seaman's hazard, no matter what type of equpment he is using to do the
work. "The risks themselves arise from and are incident in fact to the ser-
vice
32344 F.2d 204, 1965 A.M.C. 1192 (3d Cir.), cert. denzed, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
33 Eight bucketfuls of nitrate from the crane filled the hopper.
34 E.g., Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2 657, 1964 A.M.C. 2249 (3d Cir.
1964); Litwmowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959). In
Thompson, supra, the sip's lines were used by the longshoremen to position railroad
cars near the sup so that they could be unloaded with the sip's winches. Plaintiff was
injured when the cars being pulled in this manner collided with the ones that had already
been unloaded. In Litwinowtcz, supra, plaintiff was on a railroad car beside the sip in
the process of breaking out steel beams to be loaded onto the ship when he was injured.
But see Partenweederei, MS Belgrano v. Weigel, 299 F.2d 897, 1962 A.M.C. 1327 (9th
Cir. 1962).
35 E.g., Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563, 1964 A.M.C. 1582
(3d Cir. 1963) (longshoreman in warehouse unloading truck loaded with cargo taken
from sip held an integral part of the unloading process); Strika v. Netherlands Ministry
of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 1951 A.M.C. 84 (2d Cir. 1950) (replacing hatch cover left on
dock during unloading).
36 In Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966), the court in attempt-
ing to impose limits on the beginning of the loading process and the termination of the
unloading process said: "We find no authority which would cause us to hold that every
piece of equipment and every activity leading up to or following the loading or unload-
ing operation must be covered under the warranty of seaworthiness. We are concerned
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which a worker may make some contribution to the discharge of the vessel, and
yet not be considered as doing the sip's work."3t The court in Litwinouncz v.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. 3 8 adequately expressed the extent of the loading process:
The term loading is not a word of art, and is not to be narrowly and hyper-
technically interpreted. Plaintiffs' actions at the time of the accident were direct,
necessary steps in the physical transfer of the steel from the railroad car into the
vessel, which constituted the work of loading.
39
United States Lines Co. v. King"o reaffirmed the principle that in regard to
seaworthiness, "no distinction is presently justified between unloading and load-
ing. "41 It therefore appears that if the quoted statement from Litwnowicz is
applied to unloading as well as to loading operations, the effect is that the com-
bmed statements give a reasonable limitation to place upon these operations. It
then follows that in order to find that the longshoreman is engaged in the ship's
service and within the protection of seaworthiness, his work must be a direct and
necessary step in the physical transfer of cargo to or from the vessel.
Equipment in the Ship's Service
In order to find that equipment is within the subject matter of the warranty
of seaworthiness, the courts have traditionally required that it be part of the hull,
gear, appliances, ways, or appurtenances of the ship.42 This is not limited, how-
ever, to the usual equipment of the ship itself, but includes all other equipment
which is adopted as an appurtenance of the ship.43 Although some courts have
not always found it easy to determine whether the equipment was an appur-
tenance, equipment used in the ship's service has often been found to be an
appurtenance of the ship which used it.44 Thus, whenever the plaintiff is injured
by equipment used in this service the ship can be found unseaworthy and recovery
allowed. It is not necessary for courts to talk in terms of appurtenances, which
implies the traditional equipment on the ship, when the use of the equipment in
the ship's service can be the determining factor.45 For example, in Spann the court
with the ship and the sip's equipment attendant to the ship's duty to load and unload."
Id. at 987. (Italics in original.)
3 7 Danel v. Skibs A.S. Hilda Knudson, 253 F Supp. 758, 761 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See,
e.g., Drumgold v. Plovba, supra note 36, where plaintiff was injured when a specially-
rigged, stevedore-owned truck capsized while he was lowering the truck's stabilizing legs
to enable him to unload some shifting boards by means of the truck's boom. The boards
were to be unloaded from the truck and onto the ship where they were to be used to
prepare the ship for the loading of a cargo of gram. The court found this was still
preparation for the loading operation.
38 179 F Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Case discussed note 34 supra.
30 Id. at 817-18. (Emphasis added.)
40 363 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1966).
41 Id. at 661. See Seas Sipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96, 1946 A.M.C. 698,
705 (1946).
42 E.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206, 1963 A.M.C. 1649 (1963).
43 Cases cited note 25 supra.
44 Ibid.
45 "It is the use to which the equipment is put, i.e., its use in connection with the
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found the ship unseaworthy due to the defective shore-based hopper because it
was essential to the unloading process and was used by the ship for that purpose. 46
Stevedore-Furnished Equipment
The source of the equipment also need not be a consideration in determining
whether the equipment is within the subject matter of seaworthiness as long as
it has been adopted into the service of the ship. 47 Some courts48 have argued,
however, that if the equipment was furnished by the stevedore, it can not be
an appurtenance of the slp and will not make the ship unseaworthy if it is
defective. This, however, ignores the principle established in Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson49 and Rogers v. United States Lines,50 that liability for unseaworthmess
is the same whether the equipment is fiirmshed by the stevedore or by the ship-
owner. The shipowner is strictly liable for all equipment used by the stevedore in
the sip's service regardless of its source.
The fact that the equipment furnished by the stevedore in the Petterson and
Rogers cases was used on the ship is not a basis for distinguishing a case in which
the equipment is used or based on shore. Gutierrez5l established the principle
that a plaintiff engaged in the ship's service is protected by the warranty of sea-
worthiness even when he is working on the shore. Even though the defective
cargo containers which caused the plaintiTfs injury were located on the shore, the
ship was found unseaworthy Thus, for the purposes of unseaworthiness liability
the Court refused to distinguish between cargo containers on ship and on shore.
This case indicates that if the instrumentality causing the injury is otherwise within
the warranty,5 2 the fact that it is located on the shore need not be a consideration.
Traditional v. Modern Equipment
In attempting to delimit the subject matter of the warranty of seaworthless
some courts have looked beyond the use to which the equipment is put and have
reasoned that if the injury was caused by equipment that is not part of the
"traditional unloading gear of the ship, i.e., winches, masts and booms," the ship
is not unseaworthy and the slpowner is not liable.58 They reason that if the
ship's cargo that should be the determining factor. " Noinus, MAnxrnvm PERsoNAL
INjuims 69 (2d ed. 1966).
46 Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204, 209, 1965 A.M.C. 1182, 1200.
47 E.g., Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984, 1954 A.M.C. 1088 (1954),
-reversing per curiam 205 F.2d 57, 1953 A.M.C. 1679 (3d Cir. 1953); Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C. 860 (1954);
see Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964).
48 E.g., Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638, 1964 A.M.C. 356 (2d Cir.
1963); McKight v. N. M. Patterson & Sons, 181 F Supp. 434, 1960 A.M.C. 1760 (N.D.
Ohio 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1961).
49205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C. 860
(1954).
50 347 U.S. 984, 1954 A.M.C. 1088 (1954), reversing per curtam 205 F.2d 57, 1953
A.M.C. 1679 (3d Cir. 1953).
51373 U.S. 206, 215, 1963 A.M.C. 1649, 1656 (1963).
52 See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
53 McKmght v. N. M. Patterson & Sons, 181 F Supp. 434, 1960 A.M.C. 1760 (N.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960). "[I]t cannot be seriously contended that the
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equipment is not of the type traditionally or commonly found on the ship as part
of the ship's regular gear, it cannot be an appurtenance of the ship and is not
within the warranty.54 However, this restriction presents an unnecessary additional
consideration which has been criticized. For example, m Deffes v. Federal Barge
Lines, Inc.r the court said:
[Tihe district court would permit the slipowner to escape liability merely by
substituting a more modem method for performing the traditional work of a
seaman. We can find no support in the Supreme Court cases for adopting such
a position. Nor can we find a rational basis for drawing this distinction.56
The courts which add this requirement of traditional ship's equipment also
ignore the language of Sieracki: "That the owner seeks to have [the ship's work]
done with the advantages of more modem divisions of labor does not mim-
mize the worker's hazard and should not nullify his protection. 57 He is not at
liberty by doing this to discard his traditional responsibilities." 8 The court in Huff
v. Matson Nay. Co.,8 9 m referrmng to this statement said: "Use of more modem
equipment can no more exculpate the shipowner from his obligations than could
use of 'more modem divisions of labor."' 60 If the work being performed is m the
service of the ship, it should not be removed from the area of traditional seaman's
work merely because modem labor-saving methods and devices are being used
to carry it out.61
It cannot be said that the need for the protection given by the warranty of
seaworthiness has ended with the introduction of modem labor saving devices.
It has been stressed that "modem sophisticated mechanical devices may well
involve even more hazards than the ancient and more traditional ones."
62
crane used in the unloading operation is equipment commonly found among the ship's
gear. Both its size and sole function rebel against any argument that a ship might 'adopt"
or 'integrate' such equipment as part of its gear." Id. at 439, 1960 A.M.C. at 1766;
accord, Henry v. S.S. Mount Evans, 227 F Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1964); Miller v. Trans-
andina Cia Nav., 1964 A.M.C. 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Sherbin v. S. G. Embircos,
200 F Supp. 874, 1962 A.M.C. 1013 (E.D. La. 1962); K. A. Cockrell v. A. L. Mechling
Barge Lines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Texas 1961).
54 Cases cited note 53 supra.
55361 F.2d 422, 1966 A.M.C. 1415 (5th Cir. 1966). Plaintiff was injured by a
defective shore-based marine leg, which is a mechamcal elevator device owned and
operated by the stevedore company that is used in unloading gram.
56 Id. at 425-26, 1966 A.M.C. at 1421.
57 328 U.S. 85, 96, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 705-06 (1946).
58 Id. at 100, 1946 A.M.C. at 708.
59 338 F.2d 205, 1964 A.M.C. 2219 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943
(1965). Plaintiff was struck by a scraper which was part of a conveyor system attached
to a shore-based crane.
co Id. at 213, 1964 A.M.C. at 2230.
61 See Rodriguez v. Coastal Ship Corp., 210 F Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), which
involved an experimental ship that had two cranes on board which were originally
shore-based, and the plaintiff slipped on oil that had leaked from them. The court held
that there is "no authority for insulating the shipowner from liability when innovations
in modernizing a vessel, however timesaving and efficient they may prove to be,
at the same time increase the dangers to men working thereon." Id. at 44.
62 Huff v. Matson Nay. Co., 338 F.2d 205, 213, 1964 A.M.C. 2219, 2231 (9th Cir.
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The duty of a shipowner to supply a seaworthy vessel, appurtenant appliances,
and equipment is absolute and non-delegable. 63 Yet, if the traditional equipment
theory is followed, the shipowner could, in effect, delegate this duty by hiring a
stevedore company which uses its own modem equipment in carrying out the
loading and unloading process. 64 Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the courts
imposing this additional requirement of traditional sup's equipment have created
an unwarranted distinction in the liability for unseaworthmess. 65
Must the Equipment Attach to or Touch the Ship?
In looking beyond the use of the equipment in the ship's service as the only
important consideration, some courts have imposed another restriction on the
equipment subject to the warranty of seaworthiness. If the equipment never be-
came physically attached to the ship or never touched part of the ship during the
loading or unloading process, it has been held not to be an appurtenance of the
ship and hence not within the protection of seaworthness. 66 These courts reason
that since the equipment was not attached to or on the ship the shipowner had
no opportunity to inspect it for defects, and thereby learn of any unseaworthy
conditions which existed. But the Supreme Court has held that "the shipowner's
actual or constructive knowledge of the unseaworthy condition is not essential to
his liability."6 7 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the shupowner inspected the
1964). The court went on to say that the hazards involved were those of the unloading
process, and the job of the plaintiff involved more hazards than if he used a traditional
device, such as a shovel.
63 E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
64 See Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 338 F.2d 205, 213, 1964 A.M.C. 2219, 2230 (9th
Cir. 1964).
5 "If the owner engages others who supply the equipment necessary for stevedoring
operations, he must still answer to the longshoreman if the gear proves to be unsea-
worthy. " Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 317 n.3, 1964
A.M.C. 1075, 1077 n.3 (1964). Relying on this language, the court in Huff v. Matson
Nay. Co., supra note 64, at 210, 1964 A.M.C. at 2226, said this statement "makes it
plain that the shipowner's obligation of seaworthiness extends to all equipment for
loading or unloading supplied by the stevedoring contractor."
6
6 Forkm v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638, 1964 A.M.C. 356 (2d Cir. 1963),
where the court held that a shore-based conveyor was not an appurtenance until affixed
to the vessel. Plaintiff was injured in the process of attaching the conveyor to the vessel
for use. A more reasonable argument the court could have made is that since the con-
veyor was not yet ready for use as an appurtenance of the ship, and not yet carrying
out the ship's service, it was not within the subject matter of the warranty of seaworthi-
ness. Other cases that uphold the "touching" requirement: McKnight v. N.M. Patterson &
Sons, 181 F Supp. 434, 1960 A.M.C. 1760 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 251 (6th
Cir. 1961); Henry v. S.S. Mount Evans, 227 F Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1964); Miller v.
Transandina Cia Nay., 1964 A.M.C. 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Sherbin v. S. G. Embmcos,
200 F Supp. 874, 1962 A.M.C. 1013 (E.D. La. 1962); K. A. Cockrell v. A. L. Mechling
Barge Lines, Inc., 192 F Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
67 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549, 1960 A.M.C. 1503, 1512
(1960).
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equipment or not.68 Once the unseaworthy condition is found to exist the ship-
owner is strictly liable regardless of any lack of fault.
69
In Gutierrez,70 the Supreme Court held the shipowner liable for the unsea-
wortiness of the defective cargo bags, which were neither "touching" nor
"attached to" the vessel at the time of the injury. This decision should have re-
solved the problem.71 Whether the eqinpment, appurtenant appliances, or cargo
containers were ever attached to or were ever on the vessel should not be a
consideration,72 as long as the equipment is otherwise within the subject matter
of the warranty.73
Should the Warranty be Extended?
The basic underlying theory of the warranty of seaworthiness is to provide re-
covery on an absolute liability basis against a shipowner to those workers engaged
in the ship's service.7 4 The Court in Sierackz stated:
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well known
instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which per-
forming the service inposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of
negligence nor contractual m character. It is a form of absolute duty owing
to all within the range of its humanitarian policy.7
5
The reason for initially bringing longshoremen within the protection of the war-
ranty was the fact that a seaman and a longshoreman risk the same hazards when
loading and unloading a vessel: the hazards imposed by the performance of the
6s E.g., Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 426, 1966 A.M.C. 1415,
1422 (5th Cir. 1966); Huff v. Matson Nay. Co., 338 F.2d 205, 215, 1964 A.M.C. 2219,
2233 (9th Cir. 1964). See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra note 67, where ship-
owner was held liable for a temporary unseaworthy condition arising after the ship went
to sea.
69 "It is only necessary to show that the condition upon which the absolute liability
is determined-unseaworthmess-exsts. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96
That has been shown here." Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir.
1953), afd per curzam, Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C. 860
(1954).
70 373 U.S. 206, 1963 A.M.C. 1649 (1963).
71 The fact that the cargo containers were previously on the vessel should not
matter since it is not necessary to show, as in negligence cases, that the shipowner had
complete control of the instrumentality. E.g., Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478
(9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curtam, 347 U.S. 396, 1954 A.M.C. 860 (1954). See Mitchell
v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550, 1960 A.M.C. 1503, 1512 (1960) where the
Court said: "What has evolved is a complete divorcement of unseaworthmess liability
from concepts of negligence."
72 The courts in Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 338 F.2d 205, 1964 A.M.C. 2219 (9th
Cir. 1964), and Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 1966 A.M.C. 1415
(5th Cir. 1966) expressly abandoned this distinction as arbitrary even though they
could have upheld it since in Huff the scraper was attached to the sides of the hold,
and in Deffes the marine leg was resting on the bottom of the barge.
'73 See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
74 Cases cited note 3 supra.
75 Seas Stnpping Co. v. Sieracl, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 704 (1946).
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ship's service.7 6 A longshoreman who is performing the ship's service faces
these hazards of the loading and unloading operations regardless of the type of
equipment used in carrying it out. As long as the equipment is an instrumentality
of the ship's work the hazards arising from its use are the same. Neither the
location of the equipment nor the fact that it is a modem labor-saving device
should limit the shipowner's liability if he has adopted this equipment for use
in the service.
The need for application of the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen
is great due to the high risk of injury which is incident to the hazardous duties
performed.7 7 The statutory compensation 7s provided for longshoremen is obviously
inadequate. 7 9 The longshoreman is the one least able to bear the additional risk of
loss. Since it is he who is performing this hazardous service, and it is the ship-
owner who is reaping the benefits, it is only fair and just to put the cost of
injuries upon the shipowner.8 The true function of the warranty is the "allocation
of the losses to the enterprise, and within the several segments of the enter-
prise to the institution or institutions most able to imminime the particular risk
76 Ibid.
77 Longshoremen, at least in the Port of New York, are subject to one of the highest
accident frequency rates in the United States. See Note, 75 YAIE L.J. 1174, 1186-87
n.55 (1966). Also, the negligence remedy is obviously inadequate. NoRms, MAirmNX
PERsoNAL INJURms 28 (2d ed. 1966).
78 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1964), which unposes strict liability on the stevedore employer for
death or injury upon navigable waters.
79 Section 33(a) of the act, 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1964)
preserves the longshoreman's right of action for damages against third parties. Thus the
Court m Sieracki allowed recovery to a longshoreman against the shipowner for unsea-
worthiness even though he was entitled to his statutory compensation. By allowing this
additional recovery the Court impliedly found that the statutory compensation was
inadequate. Thus the act assures the longshoreman of some compensation for his injuries
without the necessity of proving a cause of action while preserving for them their right
of action against third persons for larger amounts.
The Supreme Court has allowed the shipowner an indemnity against the stevedore
employer for accidents caused by the negligence of the stevedore, Ryan Stevedoring Co.
v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956), and also when the
unseaworthy condition results from a defect in the stevedores gear, Italia Societa v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964). This takes some of
the liability off of the faultless shipowner and enables the courts to more readily grant
recovery for unseaworthiness to the injured longshoreman.
80 "That the liability may not be limited [by contract] would seem indicated by
the stress the cases uniformly place upon its relation, both in character and in scope, to
the hazards of marine service which unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it.
These, together with their helplessness to ward off such perils and the harshness of
forcing them to shoulder alone the resulting personal disability and loss, have been
thought to justify and to require putting their burden upon the owner regardless of
his fault. Those risks are available by the owner to the extent that they may result from
negligence. And beyond this he is in a position, as the worker is not, to distribute the
loss in the shipping community which receives the service and should bear its cost."
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-94, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 703-04 (1946).
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